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Introduction |
Language first emerged as a philosophical topic in Ancient Greece when Plato
initiated the question of how things in the universe came by their names. With the
subsequent development of Aristotelian nominalism, objects came to be understood and
named according to a commonality of forms. Both thinkers focused on language as it
provided man with his ability to communicate and designate things both in themselves
and as they were perceived. However, it was Aristotle’s phenomenology that would serve
to inspire Martin Heidegger’s study of Being and language’s role in its origination and
perpetuation.
Language is generally conceived of as the medium through which man performs
both written and verbal communication, though there are many differing perspectives to
consider when approaching a study of the essence of language. On one hand, speech is
most essential; on the other, the essential moment is the thought that precedes speech.
Some hold that the essence of language dwells within the speaker, while for others it is
the interaction between speaker and listener. Speaking may be either a passive
participation in vocalizing the soul’s sentiments or it may be a system in which every
word is a sign. However, all will agree that language is the only way for man to clearly
materialize his thoughts to others, to characterize his reality, and to communicate his
ideals.
As Aristotle wrote in On Interpretation,
“Spoken words are the signs of the soul’s experiences, and written words
are the signs of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same speech
sounds; but the soul’s experiences, which they immediately signify, are
the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the
images.”1
In this conception, the essence of language is the element of commonality that successful
communication presupposes. If language is a totality of these elements that Aristotle

1

Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Language, Meaning, and Ek-sistence,” in On Heidegger and Language,
ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 4.
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identifies, then the act of processing that occurs in the time between the identification of
the soul’s sentiments and their communication through utterance is the significant
moment, whether or not it is a conscious moment. What is revealed in this moment just
prior to utterance is presupposed to be common to all, but what is it that is revealed? For
Martin Heidegger, this moment is a bringing to the fore, an unconcealment that has the
potential to elucidate the truth of Being.
Martin Heidegger was born in the conservative, rural town of Messkirch,
Germany in 1889. Though he began his academic career studying theology at the
University of Freiberg, he took up philosophy in 1911 and began teaching at the
University four years later. Heidegger’s early philosophical engagements were motivated
by his readings of Aristotle’s metaphysical questionings. Aristotle sought to discover
what it is that unites all modes of being, and Heidegger’s dedication to studying the
nature of being was inspired and driven by this philosophy. His studies in
phenomenology took place under Edmund Husserl, who had developed the bracketing
method of epoché, or a phenomenological reduction that involves suspending the natural
attitude toward our perception of the material external world. He held that by bracketing,
it is possible to attend to the contents of the nature of your experience. During his early
years as Husserl’s assistant at Freiburg, Heidegger would gain a close enough
understanding of his mentor’s phenomenological position to wholly reject it.
Martin Heidegger’s philosophical career is not without incriminating political
implications. He joined the Nazi Party in 1933 as Rector of the University of Freiburg,
which, according to popular belief, enabled him to establish Nazi educational policies in
the classrooms. Though he resigned from his position as Rector a year later and distanced
himself from National Socialist politics, a denazification committee at the university
banned him from teaching until 1949.
Through his critical studies of Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl,
Heidegger formulated the basis for Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), which was published
in 1927 long before his ousting and is now held among the most significant texts of
contemporary Continental Philosophy. The text, dedicated to Edmund Husserl in
friendship and admiration, is lengthy, complicated, and characterized by unfamiliar
language that relies on unconventional hyphenations, prefixes, and suffixes to
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communicate forms that Heidegger believed conventional language was unable to
articulate. For Heidegger, if the ability to perform a phenomenological analysis comes
before consciousness of objects, then it seems that the language used to articulate this
primordial ability must predate the language of previous ontological studies. This is why
he rejects the language of Husserlian formal ontology, replacing ideas such as
transcendental consciousness and intentionality with terms like Dasein and Being-in-theworld. The new terminology leads the reader to re-think his own understanding of
concepts in terms of Heideggerian Leitworte, or leading words, and to become more
conscious of the implications that accompany each of his utterances.
A phenomenological view of language carries the presupposition that language is
primarily driven by the meaning that the speaker intends and his audience perceives. By
this, the phenomenological view also maintains that man’s primary drive as a speaking
being is to participate in meaning-giving. Heidegger’s theory of language places an
emphasis on poetry and calls for a complete illumination of man’s existence through the
revealing of inherent meaning that poetry allows. His writings on poetry were largely
based on his exegetical reading of the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin (17701843). His reading of Hölderlin’s poetry illustrates his belief that an instrumental
approach to language will fail to communicate being in the truthful way that the language
of poetry can communicate being. Heidegger presents a new approach to understanding
characterized by a repudiation of the language of technology and a renewed emphasis on
intrinsic value, which requires a rejection of the modern subject.
In this paper, I will introduce Heidegger’s take on the question of being and the
ways in which it leads to a repudiation of both Cartesian subjectivity and the instrumental
values it promotes in his opus, Being and Time. In the first chapter, I will explicate
Heidegger’s idea of the presence of truth in art and art’s potential to allow truth to be
uncovered, as he writes in The Origin of the Work of Art. In the second chapter, I will go
on to show that Heidegger believed poetry to have the same truth revealing capabilities as
great art. In his essays What Are Poets For? and Language, Heidegger places man in a
dark era of technological dominance before he posits that the language of great poetry
can allow man to dwell once again in a world in which he is aware of intrinsic values and

6
truth. He maintains that use of language in this way does not rely on the presence of a
subject.
Finally, I will point out the objections posed by Theodor Adorno (1903-1960) in
Parataxis and The Jargon of Authenticity and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1940-2007) in
Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. While Adorno’s perspective leads him to disagree
with Heidegger’s failure to recognize the historical and conceptual differences between
poetry and the essay as form, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that his combination of poetry,
origin, and being is politically motivated and therefore problematic. Adorno takes issue
with Heidegger’s abandonment of modern subjectivity and argues that subjectivity is
located within man’s ability to express beyond designations. Lacoue-Labarthe finds
Heidegger’s “fascist” manipulation of Hölderlin to be problematic in the context of his
involvement in the National Socialist political climate. For both thinkers, Heidegger’s
blend of poetry and philosophy remains an issue.
It seems to me that poetry’s place on the spectrum of expression between the
semiotic and the explicit means that the very qualities which convince some of its
potential to effectively convey meaning and communicate truth render it problematic for
others. The question of poetry’s ability to communicate intrinsic meaning is an important
subject for questioning, as Heidegger’s critics have proven by taking up his work in the
first place. Though they attack the implications of a return to the scattered syntax of the
great poets, if we are to ignore poetry’s unique structures, we are left with nostalgia for
the intrinsic tenets of being-in-the-world that are passed over by a wholly technical
understanding of language. As I explore the differences between the idea of the self that
Heidegger sees illuminated by poetry and the limitations of the modern subject, I hope to
reveal that Heidegger’s aim is not to reconstitute the world from a poetic perspective but
rather to restore the ontological through an engagement with what already is. Ultimately,
I hope to show why the language of poetry figures so prominently in both Heidegger’s
writings on language and in the objections of his critics.

7

1 | Articulating Being

In Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes a phenomenological study in an effort
to discover meaning in man’s encounters with objects. His project is to uncover the
meaning and mystery of Being itself rather than the meaning of particular, individual
beings. What he is truly seeking to elucidate is what it means for an entity to be an entity.
My first thought upon being confronted with this question was: If I am, as I have never
had reason to doubt, a human and therefore representative of an individual entity, should
I not have the power to articulate what being an entity means to me? It seems that for
Heidegger, I will fail to discover the answer in a meaningful way unless I refocus my
examination. Rather than investigating the nature of an ‘entity’, man should study the
nature of being. To give an example: if the book is on the table, what is is?
As a reader, and a being, I find it easy to ask why I have never found the need to
confront this issue before. If I operate among and assert about other beings all the time,
why should I approach the topic of being in the first place? Heidegger seems to suggest
that I have never previously been confronted with my lack of understanding because I
already possess some basic, pre-ontological concept of being. He aims to convert this
basic notion into a more explicit ontological understanding in order to avoid the
incompleteness of Husserl’s ontic matters and the traps of Cartesian dualism. We should
be able to do this, as Heidegger points out, because if we have the capacity to pose the
question of what is is in the first place, we should also possess the faculties to find the
answer within our consciousness. As he writes in Being and Time, “Dasein is an entity
which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the
fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it.”2
In order to avoid perpetuating the contamination of his discussion of Being with
the language of Cartesian dualism, Heidegger presents the notion of Dasein, or explicit,
pre-ontological being-there, and avoids a discussion of the biological body altogether.
Dasein can also be considered the clearing of being where all facets of objects become
plainly apparent to human experience. Use of the term Dasein allows Heidegger to
2

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, from Donn Welton, The Body: Classic and Contemporary
Readings, (Oxford: Backwell Publishers, 1999), 96.
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convey both form and presence and to imply the necessity of a being’s discursive
engagement in the world and his own realm. Heidegger’s emphasis on the necessity of
practical engagement illustrates his belief that man finds meaning through using and
making rather than through studying and knowing. This aspect of his writings is distinctly
un-Cartesian in that it rejects the famous notion, Cogito ergo sum. However, that is not to
say that Heidegger has truly escaped the pitfalls of mind/body dualism by simply
avoiding the use of certain terms or demoting thought from its Cartesian position as
existence-determiner.
Critics ask how Heidegger can imply that embodiment is not an essential part of
the structure of Dasein while simultaneously putting forth the idea that Dasein is never
without a body. It seems that the ‘body’ necessary for Dasein may be present in other
objects, both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, rather than in human form. If the
essence of Dasein is existence rather than form, and it exists in relation to outside objects,
it can be expressed without reference to its ontic properties. This brings to mind the
notions of spatiality and perspective seen in Husserl’s writings in relation to ontic objects.
Dasein is not in the world like water in a glass, rather it encompasses the world and is
subsumed by it at the same time. It dwells in the world and allows for ek-sistence. Man’s
Being is disclosed to him by the being-towards that characterizes ek-sistence. In Being
and Time, language is derived from the disclosedness of man’s existence. It plays an
essential role in self-realization, as man must decide how to act within his thrownness.
Without language, there would be no world in the Heideggerian sense of averageeverydayness, as the being of objects would have no conveyable meaning.
Now, as David Cerbone points out in his article, Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily
Nature’, we are met with the problem that man is merely a shell filled with this being-inthe-world, and our earlier problems with mind/body dualism have just been recategorized and put to the side. Is the body now a just presence-at-hand distilled down to
its instrumental value or is it something more? As Cerbone writes,
“Raising my arm, for example, treated as a mere bodily movement, can
be described in the languages of physics and biology, as the motion of
something with such and such mass with various goings-on at the
micro and macro-physical level. Such descriptions do not, however,
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capture the significance of the movement: I may, for example, be
raising my arm to ask a question at a colloquium, to wave to a friend,
or to drive a nail into a piece of wood.” 3
It is obvious from this example that Heidegger does not mean the body is merely presentat-hand. However, is it ready-to-hand, like his example of the hammer? Is the body the
equipment of being-in-the-world? The body is clearly a relational tool, that is, it is used
for-the-sake-of, toward-which, with-which, etc. The body is also an integrated tool, as the
arm is integrated with the torso, which is integrated with the neck and organs and so on.
A Being is also capable of seamlessly drawing upon its own relational abilities and the
integrated nature of its form, and often without any conscious attention.
However, another look shows that body parts are no more ready-to-hand than they
are present-to-hand. A human body can only be directly utilized by that individual, and
the body becomes incorporated with the self in the way a hammer never could. As
Cerbone points out, it is different to lend a hand than to lend a hammer. For Heidegger,
body parts are incorporated while equipment is not. Equipment is characterized by
readiness, while body parts possess a certain ‘capacity’ that seems to be more constant, as
it is dependent on integration. A hammer can gather dust in a shed, but a hand is called
upon at all times for various crucial purposes.4
Traditional metaphysics has so far been unable to think of the lived body, as
Heidegger sought to define it. Although it is possible to come to an understanding of the
nature of motility and gesturing as physical and biological properties of the natural body,
we have yet to find a way to ontologically reconcile our natural body with our lived body.
It appears that the closest Heidegger gets to a reconciliation of the two is when he speaks
in terms of “embodiment”. As David Kleinberg-Levin points out in his text, this term
“carries us past the inveterate tendency to reify what we are trying to think and
understand and engage”. 5 Now we can speak of Dasein in a dynamic way without

3 David Cerbone, “Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily Nature’”, in in Donn Welton (ed.), The Body:
Classic and Contemporary Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series Editor), Blackwell Readings in
Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 217.
4 Cerbone, “Heidegger and Dasein’s Bodily Nature”, 113-114.
5
David Kleinberg-Levin "The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger's Thinking of
Being," in Donn Welton (ed.), The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series
Editor), Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 128.
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referring to it as a physical object, and we can gain a clearer picture of the ontological
aspect of our embodied experiences.
As Kleinberg- Levin illustrates, our task as beings is to seek to “redeem” our preontological understanding through a hermeneutical approach to our embodied
experiences. The most effective way to achieve this is to be conscious of all gestures,
moods, and experiences as they exemplify openness and participate in a questioning of
the intrinsic value inherent to existence itself through everyday living. Man must be open
to all that which is ‘other’, as this openness seems to be constitutive of man’s ontological
embodiment. An ongoing appreciation of ontological being can be maintained by heeding
the call to openness, as that is the deepest level of awareness. It seems that Heidegger
believes himself to have reconciled the problem of mind/body dualism by asserting that
Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-World but that Dasein also is the
ontological embodiment of our openness-to-being. This hermeneutic approach to an
explanation of Dasein communicates the struggle of articulating Being. The original
language of Heidegger’s text appears to mirror the relationship between Dasein and the
world, as his leading words, or Leitworte, act as an illustration of the kind of usable,
active attitude about existence he is trying to convey.
Heidegger’s idea that Being can extend beyond the epistemological to the
ontological allows him to get closer to certainty about the nature of the lived body by
considering existence in its earliest form. This existential analytic provides a clearer
phenomenological description of the lived body’s encounters with the world. Whereas
Rene Descartes presented a world full of objects waiting to be encountered in present-athand form as mere structures, and Edmund Husserl focused on appearances and
sensations, Heidegger’s world of readiness-to-hand allows a deeper level of constant
connection between the self and the world. He defies the spatiality that Descartes and
Husserl both relied upon, and instead of isolating the subjective consciousness he
dissolves its autonomy it by throwing it out into the world to relate to all things.
In his later writings, Heidegger would maintain his engagement with the problem
of how to gain an ontological understanding of Being. He concerned himself with
language in order to locate a foundation for its basic assumptions and reinterpret it in
light of his quest to determine the meaning of Being. While he grants that language is a

11
system of signs and symbols in Being and Time, he goes on to pursue the pre-ontological
relationships between modern philosophical conceptions of speech and language. For
example, he asks what it is about man that forms the footing for this conception of
language. In his pursuit of language he does not seek to elucidate the system of sounds
and words, but rather the ways in which they communicate and allow meaning to
manifest in an articulated form. Speech plays a role in both utilitarian identification and
extra-verbal communication.
Logos, as a way of dealing with language, is the result of the phenomenological
approach and the idea of disclosedness Heidegger puts forth in Being and Time. Together
with mood and understanding, Logos constitutes disclosedness from the moment of
understanding to the moment of assertion.6 This allows things that are understood by the
speaker to become articulated to his audience. As Jan Aler writes in his article,
Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time, “Language came to the fore as
an accidental moment in the structure of assertion—namely, “speaking forth”
(Heraussage), “statement” (Aussagesatz). Logos, however, is a constituent of assertion as
pre-lingual but articulated explanation.” 7 Both Logos and language are integral to the
ontological structure of assertion, though language is what we recognize to be essential in
the average-everydayness of social experiences.
In Being and Time, Heidegger writes that the structure of Dasein must be freed.
Dasein as Logos is equiprimordial with understanding, and language is the expression of
this Logos. He writes, “The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time
will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s
disclosedness. The existential ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk.”8 It
seems that this means anything with the potential to be intelligible in primordial
understanding has the potential to be articulated. Therefore, this is what initially allows
Being-in-the-world to be articulated. If discourse always articulates intelligibility and
understanding, the discourse that language expresses is existentially language. It is
disclosedness that allows for this expression.
6

Jan Aler “Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time,” in On Heidegger and
Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 49.
7
Aler, Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time, 50.
8 Martin Heidegger, “Being and Time” (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 203.
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Disclosedness is a making-manifest in which language takes part by constituting
(1) the about which (2) announcement (3) communication (4) manifestation in a
utilitarian system which contrasts with Heidegger’s later, more poetic style.

9

Disclosedness also leads to truth, and hearing and keeping silent specifically enable
discourse’s function in the existentiality of existence to become “entirely plain”.

10

Through this hearing and keeping silent, language leads to a realization of the truth of
existence. Heidegger is now able to accomplish his ontological goals with this idea that
language as disclosedness allows for thrownness and appropriation of an entity’s Being.
In this thrownness, man is both actively and passively involved in meaning-giving by
way of his language. Language is not merely an animation of words made possible by the
mechanical processes of the vocal cords; it is a passive participation in recognition of the
intrinsic value of external objects.
Heidegger’s attempts to re-purpose original concepts with Leitworte illustrate this
emphasis on intrinsic value. This return to the ontological, mythic origins of language
illustrates being in such a way that it at once recalls the origins of words and frees them
from these origins. Heidegger writes of this simultaneous uncovering and preserving,
“The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most
elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common
understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which
functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.” 11
To rely on Kantian terms, this unintelligibility is caused by the pervasion of phenomena
and the forgetfulness of things in their nous. Words are more important in their capacity
to convey man’s ontological condition than to determine instrumental values. Therefore,
the foundation for man’s ontological dwelling that Heidegger seeks to create will be built
on language as a communicator of something beyond what is immediate to our
experience. This allows man’s ek-sistence to be characterized by his capability to give
meaning to the realm of equipment in which he dwells.

9

Joseph Kockelmans, “Preface,” in On Heidegger and Language (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1972), xi.
10
Heidegger, Being and Time, 204.
11
Heidegger, Being and Time., 220.
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The activity of logos is what allows man to actively disclose existence, though
logos itself is primordial and therefore unarticulated. As Jan Aler illustrates, the structure
of logos is “aprioric” but not unable to be illustrated in a conversation composed of four
moments: “ (1) I say (2) something (3) to someone (4) concerning certain events that
happened.” 12 All four moments are required for understanding to occur. As we have
seen, understanding requires hearing beyond the “acoustic phenomenon” of speech and
an attention to intrinsic meanings. This insight is what allows the speaker to hold the
listener’s attention. By this, the words and the rules that govern them fade to the
background in the moment of speaking and hearing, thus allowing moods to be disclosed.
Only in fallen, inauthentic speech, such as small talk, do words dominate the listener’s
consciousness. Man as Being-in-the-world is in a state of thrownness that allows him to
express logos existentially through language though the two are not the same. The
presence of logos within the apriori structure of consciousness allows for this transition.
In Being and Time, Heidegger gives the reader a sense that his definition of truth
falls away from the traditional understanding of truth as a sort of correctness between
assertions and the way things are. However, he does not reject it entirely—he allows that
the phenomenon of correctness is merely one aspect of truth. Truth as correctness is
merely concerned with the real. Heidegger goes beyond that to uncover ontological truth,
an apriori uncovering that allows truth to exist in the realm of the real. This uncovering is
an act of poiesis, a concept Heidegger will take up in his later essays along with a focused
inquiry into the nature of great poetry.

1.1 | Revealing Truth
In his 1950 essay, The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger sought to determine
the artist’s role in the work of art and explains that the two are implicated in a cyclical
relationship that ultimately gives way to truth. Just as the work of art could not exist
without the artist, the artist derives his title from the work of art. In order to explicate this
interrelation, Heidegger turns to an examination of the essence of art itself, which is not
12

Aler, “Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and Time”, 53.
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the same as the work of art. He observes the task of art and shows that there is a circular,
self-referential relation between art, work of art, and artist. He shows that realization
through this circular pattern is an archetype of human understanding, and he will later
utilize it to illustrate language’s role in the saying of being. Man’s ability to create allows
him to confirm his notion of his authentic self through that which he creates. For
Heidegger, we must resist the temptation to dismiss this cycle by declaring that it violates
logic. Rather, it must be closely followed in order to determine the origins, goals, and
revelatory potential of great art.
Our starting point will be the work of art. As the work of art is a piece of art as a
whole, its nature must reveal something about the nature of art as a whole. Initially,
Heidegger presents the work of art as a mere thing but suggests that it is comprised of
something further and more essential. He writes, “This something else in the work
constitutes its artistic nature…The work makes public something other than itself; …it is
an allegory…a symbol.”13 It seems that the symbolic nature of the work of art cannot be
made manifest and remain independent from the thingly element. By this, Heidegger
establishes that we must define the nature of the thing and its potential to convey truth in
order to determine the extent to which the symbolic depends on it. For Heidegger, truth is
equivalent with capacity to communicate Being.
If a thing is to communicate Being, it must not be defined too generally.
Heidegger therefore picks a specific pair of shoes in a work by Van Gogh to illustrate that
a thing can transcend its status as equipment in the work of art. Though they are the shoes
of a peasant woman who certainly put them to hard use in a muddy field, they are
depicted together without their wearer or even any clinging clods of dirt. 14 For

13

Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 19.
Note: The exact painting to which Heidegger refers in The Origin of the Work of Art is a matter
of controversy among Heidegger scholars. While he may be referring to Van Gogh’s 1886 painting “A pair
of shoes”, some believe that he melded aspects from a few different of Van Gogh’s paintings, and others
believe that the shoes to which he refers actually belonged to Van Gogh, himself. So, if the shoes did not
belong to a farmer-woman at all, then does Heidegger’s theory fail before it gets off of the ground? If he is
wrong about the ontic properties of the painting, how can he possibly make any claims about its ontological
properties? It seems to me that this ambiguity proves that what is at stake is not the ontic nature of the art,
but rather the authenticity of our experience with the art. I do not mean to dismiss the attacks on the
strength of Heidegger’s phenomenological bridge between shoes and earth/world tension, but I do not think
such critiques bear on Heidegger’s goal: to find something essential disclosed in the work of great artists.
14
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Heidegger, this does not mean the painting fails to capture the more complicated story
behind the shoes. He writes,
“In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth…This equipment is
pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the
wordless joy of having once more withstood want…This equipment
belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant
woman…But perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about
the shoes.” 15
To the woman who owns the shoes, they are merely equipment. However, the viewer of
the work of art is able to behold the shoes as they participate, in their passive reliability,
in the perpetuation of the woman’s existence. The painting’s ability to render the
essential truth of the woman’s existence for the viewer is its work. The painting discloses
the nature of being for the woman in a way that recalls, for Heidegger, the ancient Greek
notion of aletheia, or uncovering. Her essential being is now able to “stand in the light of
its being.” 16
At this point, Heidegger takes stock of what he has accomplished. It now seems
that the nature of art is a working to uncover the truth of beings. It is apparent that he
does not think of truth in the western sense of correctness or justice. Art establishes truth
in the sense of emergence as it takes place through the work of art. Heidegger has now
brought art beyond the realm of the thing—beyond the realm of simple physical representation. Now the question remains, how the artist can identify this essence in the
subject so that he can uncover it.
To begin to answer this question, Heidegger points out that we must not seek to
grasp the nature of a thing in order to determine its thingly substructure. The thingly
substructure is not the “most immediate reality” of the work of art, though we had
previously treated it in that way.17 It may have appeared to be the most immediate aspect
of the work of art, but it is not where the truth is located. Now it seems that the reality of
the work will lead us to the meaning of art. He writes, “To gain access to the work, it
would be necessary to remove it from all relations to something other than itself, in order
15

Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 33.
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 35.
17
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought., 37.
16
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to let it stand on its own for itself alone.”18 This is where the artist plays his role and then
immediately bows out. He releases the art to stand on its own; he is a martyr of the
creative process that bears great art. So, where does the work belong after it no longer
belongs to him?
The work of art is “set up”—dedicated to the world it opens. The work of art
comes to be out of its materials and creates an Open in which a world is constituted. In
Heidegger’s words, “The work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps
it there. The work lets the earth be an earth.”19 This earth is not a physical object, but an
undisclosable entity that is only to be opened up when it remains tightly closed. To let the
earth be an earth is to bring it forth in its self-secluding. Here, Heidegger cites an
example that he spends later essays elaborating on, “To be sure, the poet also uses the
word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but
rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word.”20 This
act of bringing forth is the unity created by the work, and this unity is what allows the
world to work as a world. Heidegger identifies this creation of a world in the instance of
Van Gogh’s painting of the pair of shoes. It seems that a work of art creates a world and
also brings forth the truth of that world—the work of art cannot bring forth truth without
a world in which it can be received.
Now that we have established that the work of art requires a world to uncover
concealed truths, we can return to the question of the origin of these truths. We turn our
attention to the fact that the work of art has been created, and this element of creation is
the focal point of the work, regardless of the artist’s role. For Heidegger, this “factum
est” is what surpasses the artist to consistently be thrust forth from the work.21 Both the
artist, as creator, and the human who responds to the art and therefore maintains it are
necessary to preserve its truth. This preservation of truth is the essence of art. As he
writes, “Thus art is: the creative preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming

18

Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought., 39.
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 45.
20
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 46.
21
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 63.
19

17
and happening of truth.” 22 This truth arises in the act of composition, “as the poet
composes a poem”.23
At this point in the essay, Heidegger shifts his attention to poetry and begins to
advance the ideas he will develop further in his later essays. He writes, “All art, as the
letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.”24
Poetry goes beyond the realm of the unreal to illuminate the Open through a linguistic
venturing. For Heidegger, this is apparent if considered in light of the “right concept of
language”. Language must not be thought of as a mere means for communication and
signification. Rather, it must be thought of as a means to bring things into the Open, as
that is what is most essential to its speaking. Without language, beings could not be
brought to appearance by naming. This projection of names constitutes the thrownness of
things into world and earth where poetry can speak their unconcealedness.
Unconcealedness allows a people’s world historical character to be brought into the
world. He writes
“Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in
which a people’s world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved
as that which remains closed… In such saying, the concepts of an
historical people’s nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are
formed for that folk, before it.”
By this, Heidegger differentiates the language of poetry from everyday language while
maintaining that the essential nature of language is poetry. As poesy, the most original
form of essential poetry, language constructs a place for poetry’s ability to comprise art
and found truth. This founding of truth through bestowing, grounding, and beginning is
what allows for the preservation of art that is essential to its ability to communicate.
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2 | Dwelling in the Abyss
After

Being

and

Time,

Heidegger’s

turned

his

thought

toward

the

phenomenological truth allowed by the language of poetry. Heidegger’s writings on
poetry are meant to serve as a critique of modern subjectivity and a guide to help man can
recover his wonder at things at once both self-withdrawing and revealed. In this section, I
hope to explain why Heidegger rejects the limitations of subjectivity in favor of being in
the sense of Gelassenheit, or releasement toward things.
In his collection of essays, Poetry, Language, Thought, Heidegger seeks to
discover the true nature of language and its role in articulating Being by conducting a
linguistic exploration of man’s consciousness. He does not take an anthropological,
religious, or logical approach, but rather succeeds in his essays by following a poetic
path. He begins by pitting man against an abyss in a dark era and challenges the poets to
find a way to best experience this lack of ground through linguistic venturing. Although
he spends the majority of his first essay characterizing the unshielded nature of man’s
being, Heidegger goes on to examine how this unshieldedness is chiefly what
characterizes man’s unique capacity for language in his last two essays. His analysis of
poetry throughout his essays allows him to study language by entering into language’s
speaking of itself, rather than focusing only on man’s speaking of language, which he
believes to abysmal. Ultimately, Heidegger seeks to prove that language holds meaning
within itself rather than drawing it from a correspondence model of reference foreign to
the subject; within poetry exists the potential to uncover truth as it exists in the world.
However, this is not to say that language should be utilized as a tool for characterizing
the instrumental value of objects. He builds on his writings in Being and Time to suggest
that poetry, as Sprachkunst, is uniquely capable of giving man a foundation built on
uncovering intrinsic value in his unfounded world.25
Heidegger begins his quest in the essay What Are Poets For?, in which he sets out
to answer the question of what poets must do in a destitute time. He begins by
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characterizing the era to which we belong as a dark, destitute one. He writes, “…the
evening of the world’s age has been declining toward its night. The era is defined by the
god’s failure to arrive, or the “default of God”.” 26 Heidegger goes even further to
radicalize this concept by holding that man is forgetful of the default of God. He writes
that the current era is a destitute time devoid of reason, as man has lost the sense that
objects have value beyond their instrumental worth. It seems that God is the ultimate
giver of value and the reason for intrinsic value of objects, but man has become forgetful
of this in the recent cultural shift toward the destitute era. In this destitute, value-centric
Age of Technology, man commits the great sin of ascribing human values to things of
heaven and earth, which, for Heidegger, is a sign of the forgetfulness of the default of
God.27
In this forgetful state, man believes that objects have value only insofar as they
serve some human end. If man believes nothing is instrumentally viable on its own apart
from human aims, man must have forgotten that there is a god who gives intrinsic value
to things regardless of man’s awareness. This utilitarian emphasis has led humanity into
an abyss. He challenges mortals to reach into this abyss and “come into ownership of
their own nature” rather than trying to escape.28 He seeks to communicate Being in a way
that transcends this compulsion toward valuation. For Heidegger, man can achieve this
through poetry.
In this abysmal, post-philosophical era, Heidegger’s theory of poetic language
explains how man can think non-representationally and avoid the violence technology
does to its objects by giving them a value. By avoiding subjectivity, man can avoid
violence. He can let things be in their object-ness by letting go of his need to reify and
dominate them. This requires him to relinquish his subjectivity to preserve a
philosophical, phenomenological outlook. Poetic language has the potential to free man
from his instrumental use of language and allow him to dwell poetically and be liberated
from technology. Heidegger holds that poetry can bridge the gap between the realm of
technology, in which truth and being are covered up, and the realm of thinking.
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Heidegger holds that the poet is best equipped to delve into the abyss because he
“entrenches himself in purposeful self-assertion, and by means of absolute objectification
installs himself in the parting against the Open, then he himself promotes his own
unshieldedness.” 29 It is the poet’s obligation to “retrieve truth from the void of
forgetfulness” and bring it to light by seeing things in themselves.30 The subject/object
construct of man’s consciousness necessitates this ‘unshieldedness’ in order for him to
objectify things outside of himself and experience the safety created by this venturing.
This venturing is a synonym for the Dasein. Dasein identifies the dwelling or ek-sistence
of a being within the historical frame of the infinite horizon of consciousness that
encompasses the Open. Heidegger goes on to say that this historical frame is brought
about by language. He writes, “Language is the precinct…the house of being…It is
because language is the house of Being, that we reach what is by constantly going
through this house.” 31 Additionally, his essay Das Seiende reads, “Language is the
primordial poetry through which a people speaks being.”32 For Heidegger, the concept of
Being is inextricably linked to poetic language.
Heidegger suggests that man’s representational consciousness is structured so that
it takes the objects it identifies and ‘consumes’ them in their objective unshieldedness
before moving on to new objects.33 He writes, “What is presumed to be eternal merely
conceals a suspended transiency, suspended in the void of a durationless now.”34 This
seems to mean that only language is capable of prevailing in terms of describing
existence, because it is inexhaustible and has the ability to reach things in their thingness.
If language is the thing more daring than Being, the poet is capable of daring the abyss by
entering into its speaking. It seems that he believes that although man cannot venture or
will himself into the abyss, he can dare it with language. However, this daring is not a
way for man to escape his un-grounded state. The question of this essay is not how to
use technology or language to free man from the destitute time, but rather how language
must be thought of as a medium to experience it most effectively. While man uses
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technology to control, dominate, and exploit nature as a result of his subjective
consciousness, he can use poetry as an outlet for his willing because poetry is a limitless
resource for him. For Heidegger, this explains why poets wield such power when it
comes to uncovering the truth of Being through language.
Heidegger begins his essay, “Language”, by reiterating the notion that man’s
natural capability of speaking sets him apart from other organisms. He writes, “Man
speaks… We speak because speaking is natural to us… It is held that man, in distinction
from plant and animal is the living being capable of speech.”35 These statements seem to
be obvious. However, the reader soon discovers that Heidegger is more preoccupied with
language’s power to define and uncover “essences”. He begins with what appears to be
an empty tautology, “Language is language”, and goes on to show that this phrase will
not leave us falling into the absurd, infinite regress of man’s dependence on actual words.
Heidegger explains this when he reminds the reader, “To reflect on language thus
demands that we enter into the speaking of language in order to take up our stay with
language, i.e., within it’s speaking, not within our own.” 36 This seems to mean that
language is misused when employed as a mere tool to designate values within the realm
of rules constructed by society. Entering, as the great poets do, into the speaking of
language represents a withdrawal from the territory of valuation and the acceptance of a
certain passivity with regard to expression.
Heidegger seeks to discover the truth of objects by uncovering them as they are.
The original Greek term aletheia, or uncovering, characterizes Heidegger’s mission as a
“truth-seeker” as it implies that truth derives from an uncovering of what already is. For
Heidegger, it is important that man “must see [things] as they are in themselves and not
merely as they are for him.”37 This draws a distinction between reality as utility and
reality as independent existence. For Heidegger, man has the potential to access things in
themselves. He does not subscribe to the Kantian notion that it is impossible to know
things in their nous. He believes that the poets are best equipped to do this because they
have the gift of language, which enables them to experience the Open and communicate
whatever objective truths they uncover without imposing an instrumental value. In great
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poems, poets present a combination of poetry and thought: “The voice of thought must be
poetic because poetry is the saying of truth, the saying of the unconcealedness of
beings.”38
Heidegger draws upon the poetry of Hölderlin to affirm his belief that poetry is
the only way to elucidate Being. Hölderlin writes, “Man dwells poetically on this earth”,
and Heidegger believes that poets are messengers who make man aware of this dwelling
by allowing him to conceptualize the divine through objective truth. He holds that poets
are just as important to understanding Being as thinkers are because they place ordinary
objects in their context within the scheme of Being and relate objects to a higher level. In
other words, “to dwell poetically on earth is to find in the simple and homely things of
every-day experience the divine and the holy.”39 Whereas philosophers contemplate and
interpret being, poets rediscover its very nature.
For Heidegger, the poets succeed because they avoid subjectivism. I have already
mentioned that Heidegger’s main complaint about the Age of Technology involves the
notion that it is an age in which everything is manipulated and given a value. The
historical frame of this destitute era is characterized by man’s vision of himself in relation
to objects as things that can benefit him. If something exists, it has value. Heidegger
argues that this contributes to man’s homeless, unsheltered state, and he seeks to remedy
this by curing man’s forgetfulness of the source of his being and returning him from the
Abgrund, or abyss. For Heidegger, man’s primary duty is to listen, and man’s
problematic approach to language in the Age of Technology is an active one in its
subjectivity—he forgets to listen. Heidegger’s concept of the Abgrund is uniquely well
suited to illustrate anti-utilitarian perspective in that man cannot exploit his surroundings
if he is in a groundless state.
But what about Heidegger’s concept of language as the House of Being? It seems
that a deeper understanding of this assertion will reveal the structure behind man’s ability
to dwell poetically, which Heidegger will discuss later. In his essay, “Language”,
Heidegger further investigates the questions that arise from his assertion: “Language
speaks.” He defines what it is to speak and how man must best learn to make use of

38
39

Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 72.
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 420.

23
speech. Heidegger reveals that he is not trying to create a new way of looking at
language. Rather, he is emphasizing the importance of “learning to live in the speaking of
language”, just like he was seeking how to best experience the Abgrund in previous
essays.40 Speech in this sense refers to listening in tandem with passive articulation rather
than the communication of cultural constructs. He analyzes Georg Trakl’s poem, “A
Winter Evening”, and reveals how he believes the language of the three-stanza poem to
be a metaphor for the nature of language. By recalling the central issue of the dif-ference
from Being and Time, Heidegger reveals that he believes language to be joined together
with man’s nature without being overlapped with it or enmeshed in it. This will lead to an
explanation of what it is to dwell poetically.
Heidegger begins the second half of the essay by reestablishing the central
issue of the “speaking”. He says that language speaks, not man. He identifies that to
speak is to name, to name is to call, to call is to bid, or invite things and world into our
consciousness. This means that language, in the form of speech, calls things into our
consciousness. He writes that this takes place by nature of the dif-ference, or the division
that prevails between world and thing that characterizes the middle of their penetration of
each other. It seems that world and language are interchangeable as Heidegger writes,
“World grants things…they penetrate each other”.41 To further characterize this ‘middle’
he writes, “The dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into
bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things.”42
The dif-ference is the bidder, and Heidegger tracks the bidding of language
throughout Trakl’s poem. He follows each of the stanzas as he believes they bid,
respectively, things, world, and the intimacy between them.

A WINTER EVENING
Window with falling snow is arrayed,
Long tolls the vesper bell,
The house is provided well,
The table is for many laid.
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Wandering ones, more than a few,
Come to the door on darksome courses.
Golden blooms the tree of graces
Drawing up the earth’s cool dew.
Wander quietly steps within;
Pain has turned the threshold to stone.
There lie, in limpid brightness shown,
Upon the table bread and wine.43
For Heidegger, language speaks in this poem. The intimacy in the third stanza
that brings thing and world together is produced by the introduction of Trakl’s concept of
Pain. Heidegger writes, “Pain joins the rift of the dif-ference. Pain is the dif-ference
itself.”44 He goes on to interpret that pain is not a human sensation, but the seam that
binds together world and things. As the dif-ference, pain is the “luminous joining” that
“expropriates the world into its worlding, which grants things.” This penetration of thing
and world is a central issue in this essay, but Heidegger does not seem to be implying that
it has any cultural significance. Trakl’s poem is most relevant to Heidegger because it
articulates the four-fold nature of the world thus encouraging man to experience the
world in itself. The concept of the four-fold seems to be one of Heidegger’s most
complicated, and I find it to be best elucidated by Herbert Spiegelberg in his paper Das
Ding,
“Earth and sky, divinities and mortals—being at one with one another
of their own accord—belong together by way of the simpleness of the
united fourfold. Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of
the others. Each therewith reflects itself in its own way into its own,
within the simpleness of the four…The appropriate mirroring sets each
of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the
simplicity of their essential being toward one another.”45
It seems that man is capable of experiencing the four-fold without being limited by his
subjectivity because it is characterized by “essential being”. In “…Poetically man
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Dwells…”, Heidegger will note that man’s dwelling is dependent on the fourfold, as
“Man’s dwelling depends on an upward-looking measure-taking of the dimension, in
which the sky belongs just as much as the earth.”46 This seems to reflect a different, preevaluative cultural attitude that is capable of measuring without seeking to dominate. He
will add that poetry is the only medium still capable of this measuring.
Heidegger returns to the concept of the dif-ference to characterize its ability to
“still things in thinging and the world in worlding” and gather them into the rift as the
peal of stillness.47 This leads Heidegger to conclude, “Language speaks as the peal of
stillness… language goes on as the taking place or occurring of the dif-ference for world
and things”.48 Although he says that the peal of stillness is not human, speech is indeed
human nature and human beings are brought into their own by language. He explains this,
“language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of stillness
for the hearing of mortals.”49
Heidegger goes on to reiterate that mortal speech is designating names and
thereby bidding thing and world to come. He identifies that mortals call the dif-ference
by responding, and that they “heed the bidding call of the stillness of the dif-ference” by
nature.50 It seems that mortals exist in language by listening in the peal of stillness and
responding. This recalls Heidegger’s approach to the abyss in the previous chapter, as he
identified that it was more important to learn how to experience the abyss than to learn
how to defy it. He identifies the root behind man’s ability to dwell poetically when he
notes, “What is important is learning to live in the speaking of language.”51
Heidegger proves in this essay that it is foolish of the reader to take his assertion,
“Language is language”, as a simple tautology. He uses the essay to lay out a logical plan
that links man’s nature with language in a way that draws them into one another without
overlapping them.
However, Heidegger does not conclusively prove that man’s subjective conscious
is capable of becoming wholly fused with things. Although he has just conducted a close
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reading of Georg Trakl’s “A Winter Evening”, a closer look at his analysis reveals that he
has not really provided any definitive interpretation of the text. Man is set apart from
things (in the gathering sense) because he can only experience objects through the
Vorstellung of his own consciousness. Therefore, how can he definitively interpret
anything? Heidegger writes in his “Letter on Humanism”, “Being is the nearest thing. But
this nearness remains furthest away from man… To experience and to say this—this is
what the thinking of the future will have to learn.”52 Heidegger holds that to reflect on the
nature of language is to use speaking as an abode for this nearest being of mortals.53 In
“Language”, he redefines what it means to truly speak in order to establish a foundation
for his discussion of man’s consciousness. In the linguistic struggle between instrumental
and intrinsic values, man is conditioned to default towards dominance because he is an
agent of valuation and wholly enmeshed in technology. In order to return to what is
essential in speech, that is, uncovering of intrinsic value, man must be attuned to the call
of the dif-ference.
Heidegger writes that there are three generally accepted assertions regarding
speech. First, it is held that speech allows expression in that, “If we take language to be
utterance, we give an eternal, surface notion of it at the very moment when we explain it
by recourse to something eternal.”54 This seems to explain language at its most intuitive,
cultural form. Expression is what allows the communication of thoughts and ideas and
encompasses language as a basic neuronal process. However, Heidegger warns that
language can become nothing more than printed word when used merely for reference.
He writes language as reference alone, “will never help us to escape from the inversion of
the true relation of dominance between language and man.”55 Though he is essentially a
speaking being whose linguistic capabilities came before his first utterances, man
continues to wrongly ignore the provenance of his ability to signify in his daily
discourses. This ignorance of his own essence has caused him to be further alienated
from the intrinsic value of objects—things in themselves. The inverted relation caused by
this ignorance leads man to believe that he is the master of language.
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For Heidegger, speech is an activity of man in that it is the activity that allows for
his existence, or, “It is language that first brings man about, brings him into existence.”56
Finally, he characterizes speech in the greater context of human expression as “a
presentation and representation of the real and the unreal.”57 This is the characterization
that allows speech to create a historical framework for being. Language always
communicates what man’s representational consciousness comes up with, so it is always
a representation and therefore secondary which seems to be pejorative. However, for
Heidegger, this representation is precisely what gives man the potential to dwell free of
the modern notion of subjectivity.
Heidegger acknowledges that man is incapable of circumscribing the whole
nature of language, but he uses these three definitions to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of speech, although he questions their “correctness” because, “despite their
antiquity and despite their comprehensibility, they never bring us to language as
language.” 58 Heidegger maintains that the most comprehensive way to experience
language as language is to return to the tautological assertion that “Language speaks.”
This realization leads him back to the notion that poetry is the “purest” medium when it
comes to communicating the nature of things as they are. It is a symbolic way that is able
to come very close to the purely semiotic in its method of signification. Man dwells
within poetry, as he is always already at home there.
In “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, Heidegger reads into all the implications of
Friedrich Hölderlin’s assertion and responds to the phrase itself. He begins to pick apart
the phrase by questioning each component. First, he recalls his notion that man is made
homeless by his “hunt for gain and success” spurred on by the emphasis on value in the
Age of Technology, so he asks, how is there space for the poetic in the hectic nature of
dwelling in this destitute era? Heidegger notes that this poetry mostly represents “at best
a preoccupation with aestheticizing”, and it is easy to discount it as “frivolous
mooning”. 59 These assumptions are legitimized by the pervasive instrumentalism and
alienation from language inherent in the technological age. Next, Heidegger points out
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the problem that the phrase was penned by a poet in the first place which begs the
question of whether or not poets are blind to actuality and merely bring things forth from
their imagination. He recalls the notion of original Greek poiesis and notes that this word
carries implications of bringing forth. However, it appears that Heidegger is speaking
polemically as he backtracks and explains that complete dwelling and poetic bringingforth are indeed compatible.
Heidegger points out that the word ‘dwelling’ does not necessarily refer to the
dwelling conditions in the current era. It can instead be thought of as a function of Being;
it is one of many forms of human behavior. He writes, “Perhaps the two can bear with
each other…Perhaps one even bears the other in such a way that dwelling rests on the
poetic…we are required to think of dwelling and poetry in terms of their essential
nature.” 60 Therefore, Hölderlin must be referring to poetry and dwelling in their
individual essences, rather than as the cultural constructs that man imagines them to be.
Heidegger fleshes out this point by saying that dwellings are attained through building.
Creation, or poiesis as putting forth, is a sort of building, and poetic creation allows us to
obtain dwelling. He writes, “we are to think of the nature of poetry as a letting-dwell, as
a—perhaps even the—distinctive kind of building.”61 By following this path of thought
we are to arrive at the nature of dwelling, and Hölderlin is capable of this because “he
poetizes the essence of poetry.”62 In this, he is able to see things in the house of being
because he removes them from a technological frame and creates a new frame in which
the uncovering of intrinsic values can take place.
However, Heidegger is not satisfied with this. He also goes on to ask how man
can even claim to have reasoned the nature of something. He then comes full circle in his
writings and adds that man knows such things only when he is the recipient of these
claims. Man receives these claims from language. As we have seen before, man is wrong
to act as though he controls language, for “in fact language remains the master of man.
When this relation of dominance gets inverted, man hits upon strange maneuvers.”63 He
emphasizes repeatedly that language does the speaking and man is only capable of
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speaking when he listens and responds to the call. This explains the effectiveness of
poetry as, “the responding in which man authentically listens to the appeal of language is
that which speaks in the element of poetry.” 64 Man listens more closely to the pure
language of poetry. Poetic language allows man to constantly build and produce. In order
to build, foundations are necessary. Thus, through language, man creates for himself a
grounding in the abyss. Once he has created a grounding, he no longer must rely on his
utilitarian tendencies to be rooted in the world. For Heidegger, “man is capable of
dwelling only if he has already built, is building, and remains disposed to build, in
another way.”65 Building seems to be the key. He goes on, “Authentic building occurs so
far as there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the structure of
dwelling.”66 However, he makes sure to avoid turning this into a definitive statement by
going on to bring up all the questions invited by this seemingly absolute assertion.
Heidegger concludes his essay by bringing up the question of poetry’s
transcendence. He wonders what the measure for poetry may be and concludes that it
seems to be God. So we must ask, what is God? Heidegger seeks to address this question
by distinguishing which aspects of the fourfold are alien to the god and which are alien to
man. It seems that the earthly aspects under the sky are intimate to man and therefore the
poet is able to call them. The poet’s adeptness at calling enables him to also call the
aspects of objects that conceal themselves. These aspects are familiar to the god. As
Heidegger explains, “The poetic saying of images gathers the brightness and sound of the
heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence of what is alien.” 67
However, it is man’s unique structure of consciousness that allows him to connect to
poetic language.
As we saw in Being and Time, Man’s structure of consciousness, when viewed in
the form of subject/object, means that he can only learn through negation. Therefore,
Heidegger assures the reader that man truly does have knowledge of the poetic. He
writes, “That we dwell unpoetically, and in what way, we can in any case learn only if we
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know the poetic.”68 Man only knows things in terms of other things he knows and things
he does not know. As Heidegger noted in “What Are Poets For?”, “A comparison places
different things in an identical setting to make the difference visible.”69 This setting is
man’s subjective consciousness. Thus, man dwells poetically on earth because poetic
language dares the limits of language as it expresses consciousness by revealing
concealed elements of objects.
Ultimately, for Heidegger, it is man’s capacity for responding that enables him to
use language, specifically poetic language, to create a grounding for himself in the
Abgrund. By Being in the abyss, beings are forced to venture and dare language in order
to exist in the destitute time. Heidegger holds that poets are best equipped to
communicate that which is concealed through language, as they are able to reveal things
that do not fit into the structure of our consciousness and bring the Open toward man as
an object. He writes, “Man places before himself the world as the whole of everything
objective, and he places himself before the world. Man sets up the world toward himself,
and delivers Nature over to himself.” 70 Ultimately, this frame of consciousness both
characterizes by building and is characterized by an uncovering of the historical frame
present in the Age of Technology when beyond the focus on value and production. As
Heidegger reminds the reader, “the essence of life is supposed to yield itself to technical
production.” 71 Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought seems to be in essence a
confrontation of the abyss of a dark era through poetic language with the realization that
poetic language alone allows man to dwell in the abyss. Indeed, Heidegger employs his
own theories as he uses poetic examples throughout his essays to support his assertions.
He ultimately succeeds in laying a foundation for the notion that language holds meaning
within itself rather than drawing it from a foreign correspondence model of reference.
Man needs the guidance of the poets to realize transcendent images as they are concealed
to his consciousness and to provide him with a grounding in the midst of a godless abyss.
All facets considered, Heidegger’s idea of poetic language is consistent with his
phenomenological project. As we saw in Being and Time, language is a dimension of ek68
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sistence because of its meaning-giving and uncovering properties. Because of the
phenomenological preoccupation with the flawed perspective of man’s consciousness,
our potential to gain a successful view of language is dependent on whether or not our
concept of man’s Being is successful.72 If the success of language depends on whether or
not listening and speaking are capable of asserting an always already constituted structure
of saying, then poetry is the best way to communicate the world. It calls world and things
together in such a way that they create an openness in which Being manifests itself. As
Heidegger writes, “Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to
it, and thus brings him into dwelling.”73
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3 | Criticisms
Martin Heidegger incited a large and growing debate with his writings. The
problem of the relation between his philosophy and his National Socialist politics has
divided his followers: his political involvements become either contingent or essential to
an analysis of his philosophical work. Theodor Adorno and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe are
two thinkers from different eras who shared the latter perspective. In this chapter, I will
explicate Adorno’s formal criticisms and Lacoue-Labarthe’s political criticisms as they
problematize the implications of Heidegger’s reliance on poetry.

3.1 | Adorno & Formal Implications
Theodor Adorno established himself as a leading German intellectual around
1949 with his return to Frankfurt after a Nazi-imposed exile in England and the United
States. As one of Heidegger’s most prominent critics, Adorno is also famously a critic of
positivist thought and instrumental reason. Positivism is a philosophical system within
which every rationally justifiable assertion can be scientifically verified or is capable of
logical or mathematical proof, and that therefore could be reasonably expected to reject
the metaphysics that Heidegger’s writings were born out of. However, Adorno does not
deny in his writings that language contains a moment of transcendence. Adorno finds
grounds to reject both Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and the language with which he
expresses it because he believes Heidegger to have stymied language’s transcendence in
the first place.74
Adorno notices Heidegger’s allowance of the antagonism that characterizes the
relationship between the totality of communication and the violence it does to the
particular. It seems that the essential violence that characterizes language is such that in
order for things to be elevated to the conceptual their particularity will come into
question. Adorno will point out the effects of this elevation and what it says about
74
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individuality. He is troubled by the circle between language as a medium for universality
and a tool used to render things in their particularity. As David Sherman writes,
“Heidegger’s philosophical stand against reflection does not result in a
dialectical separation always straining toward a fleeting identity between
expression and thing. Instead language tends to lose the things to which it
purportedly refers, for it no longer flows from its subject matter but rather
“seems to fly above its correlative, thereby establish[ing] itself as
something higher”. (JOA p. 87)75
His critique of Heidegger’s conceptual language leads him to suggest a different form to
provide a coherent totality.
In his literary criticisms, Theodor Adorno examines the nature of the relationship
between philosophy and literature from a methodological standpoint. He presents his
critiques in a complex, dialectical style of writing that communicates the presupposition
that whatever one writes about is characterized by irresolvable conflicts that cannot be
translated into a logic of non-contradiction. In his writings, Adorno does not try and
overcome contradiction; rather, he is conscious that social reality is characterized by
conflict, and his dialectical style reflects this consciousness. For Adorno, it would be
mere ideology to assume that a text or work of art can render any social reality in a noncontradictory manner. He holds that the truth content of any art form is located in this
contradiction, and the first task for anyone who approaches any subject matter must be to
attend to the pre-inscribed contradictions in that subject matter. Though he does not deny
that language possesses an element of transcendence, Adorno identifies the contradictions
in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and theory of language, which he problematizes in
his essay, Parataxis and his work The Jargon of Authenticity (1973). He also suggests
that the answer for the dialectical, contradictory nature of society can only be found at the
level of form. He furthers this notion in his piece, The Essay as Form. Ultimately,
Adorno is focused on the effects that language and philosophy have on the nature of
individuality.
In Parataxis, Adorno examines Heidegger’s analysis of the poetry of Hölderlin by
using the philological approach as a point of departure. This approach is based on the
75
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belief that it allows a more in depth reconstruction of intentions than the philosophical
approach would, as it objectifies subjective intention, which can be viewed as the locus of
the truth. A philological approach allows preconstruction of intentions, and subjective
intention becomes objectified. Intentionality is articulated through the poem therefore the
intention is part of rather than basis for and must be interpreted as such. In order for the
philological approach to be successful, structural unity is presupposed, and the work is
the totality. Therefore, authorial intention becomes part of the poem, and this
intentionality must be interpreted as a part of rather than a basis for the poetry. If what the
author intended to say is the truth, then everything is located within the artist. Therefore,
the process of writing could be deemed superfluous. This is problematic, as it excludes
the necessity of language and means that truth must be trans-subjective.
Language is not merely subjective, as it could not communicate without
presupposing commonality. For Adorno, it is a Philistine conception to hold that the
author has control over the final product. As Adorno writes in Notes to Literature III,
“The contradiction according to which every work wants to be understood purely on its
own terms but none can in fact be so understood is what leads to the truth content.”76
Truth content lies in the structure, and therefore Heidegger’s method of extracting
Leitworte, or thematic words, reduces the work and ignores the notion that a work of art
is the totality of its moments. This jargon, though Heidegger believes it to get closer to an
ontological understanding, is what renders his analysis problematic for Adorno—it just
covers up the destitute era rather than reaching into it. He writes that his problem with
Heidegger’s thought is that “it transforms a bad empirical reality into transcendence.”77
Heidegger transforms philosophy into literature in his reading of Hölderlin’s poetry. He
levels the conceptual differences between the two, while Adorno is always noting the
historical differences between them.
In a way, it seems that Adorno agrees with Heidegger. Poets are capable of
achieving truth, as their awareness of the unity of language constitutes a violence that is
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capable of receiving nature when considered dialectically in terms of unity. That this
unity does violence to language represents the dual character of language. As Adorno
writes of Hölderlin, “His dialectical experience does not know language merely as
something external and repressive; it also knows its truth.”78 However, he maintains the
notion of subjective intention that Heidegger rejects: “Without externalizing itself in
language, subjective intention would not exist at all. The subject becomes a subject only
through language.”79
Adorno writes, “The poetry of the late Hölderlin becomes polarized into names
and correspondences on the one hand and concepts on the other.”80 It seems that a work
is not totally reducible to its structure, and thus Adorno refutes the philological approach
he began with. This dialectical writing implies the paradoxical relationship between
poetry and philosophy. For Adorno, Hölderlin’s poetry is attractive to phenomenologists
and those who hope to elucidate the meaning of Being because of the “abstractions”,
which “bear an inviting resemblance to the medium of philosophy.” 81 However,
Hölderlin does not get any closer to an explanation of Being with the abstractions in his
poetry than Heidegger does with his Leitworte. In dealing with names, both Heidegger
and Hölderlin fail to encapsulate the idea of Being and these names become mere shells
of failed ideas.
The problem is that poetry cannot be interpreted as Aussage, or message, as what
is true of philosophy cannot be formulated into a poetic message. If the philosopher fails
to distinguish between them, as Adorno accuses Heidegger of doing, he effectively
deaestheticize poetry and it becomes philosophy. Poetry cannot be any more effective at
characterizing reality than philosophy is if it is neutralized in this way. As Adorno writes,
“The truth content’s aesthetic medium is ignored; Hölderlin is skewered on the alleged
Leitworte selected by Heidegger for authoritarian purposes.”82 It seems that, for Adorno,
Heidegger has committed the very offense he sought to avoid in his essays—he has taken
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a utilitarian approach to poetry and given it an instrumental value through his analysis of
it.
In order for the relationship between philosophy and poetry to be productive and
positive, the two must come to each other without violence. Philosophy is capable of
elucidating truth content within poetry, as poetry benefits from the conceptuality that
philosophical considerations reveal. Like the relationship between language and Being,
the relationship between philosophy and poetry cannot be understood in terms of
mastery. Poetry is a mere vehicle for philosophy, and philosophy also serves as a vehicle
for the poem as long as it remains indifferent to the poetry itself. For Heidegger, any
commentary that philosophy provides must make itself superfluous. Adorno’s problem
with Heidegger’s analysis of Hölderlin is rooted in the fact that Heidegger turns poetic
lines into statements; therefore the two are dialectically elided in his work. This makes
his discourse quasi-poetic, which is problematic for Adorno, as he holds that the
difference between the two must be respected. By picking and choosing certain words,
Heidegger is effectively detemporalizing the truth content of the poem and neutralizing
its intrinsic value. Adorno writes, “Heidegger’s is false in that, as method, it detaches
itself form the matter at hand and infiltrates the aspect of Hölderlin’s poetry that requires
philosophy with philosophy from the outside…the assertion of an unarticulated unity of
form and content is no longer adequate.” 83 This unity can only occur if the poem is
viewed as a totality.
For Adorno, Heidegger’s treatment of the poet is a misguided glorification. His,
“pseudo-poetry testifies against his philosophy of poetry”, and his “cheap heroizing of
the poet” draws the focus away from the medium that is the locus of the truth content.84
Setting Hölderlin apart with the metaphysical elevation a philosophical treatment allows
for lacks “sensitivity to the collective strength that produces spiritual individualization in
the first place... detemporaliz[ing] the truth content of philosophy and literary works.”85
By giving poetry the philosophical treatment, Heidegger already ensures that the results
83

Theodor Adorno, Parataxis, 128.
Theodor Adorno, Parataxis, 116.
85
Theodor Adorno, Parataxis, 121.
84

37
of his reading will bear witness to his method. It is apparent that Heidegger’s utilitarian
attitude toward the deconstruction of poetry is challenging in light of his belief that such
searching for instrumental value is what has caused society’s fallen status.
Adorno holds that language only designates things, which must mean that
language operates as a mere medium for universality. This is problematic because it
leaves words incapable of rendering things in their particularity. He writes, “They are
mere signs. They do not want to be that; it is a death sentence for them. This was the
price Hölderlin had to pay. His poetry diverges decisively from philosophy, because the
latter takes an affirmative stance toward the negation of existing entities.”86 In Parataxis,
this is the essential violence that characterizes language. In order for things to be elevated
to the conceptual level, they must die in their particularity. The only method of
maintaining some level of particularity is through proper names. Proper names are
supposed to render individuality, as they cannot be subsumed under generalization.
Adorno writes of the desire to retain individuality, “it is produced by nostalgia for the
missing name, as well as by nostalgia for a universality, in the good sense…”87 However,
no object is capable of resisting the universal just as no language is capable of rendering
the particularity of a thing in its essence. This means that of course Hölderlin’s poetry is
incapable of reconciling the actual and conceptual or the finite and the infinite.
Reconciliation is ultimately blocked, as language cannot be divorced from conceptuality.
Adorno says of Hölderlin, “he pointed up the untruth in any reconciliation of the general
and the particular within an ureconciled reality…”88 He reveals this dualistic nature of
language through the paratactic language of his poetry.
For Adorno, the only form that can operate without reducing concepts to objects
is the essay. He writes, “The essay allows for the consciousness of nonidentity, without
expressing it directly; it is radical in its non-radicalism, in refraining from any reduction
to a principle, in its accentuation of the partial against the total, in its fragmentary
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character.”89 The essay is the only medium capable of portraying the world as a totality,
in that its contingency necessitates a whole. As a constellation of concepts, it is free from
both philosophy and literature; it bridges the gap between the two. The essay is not an
objective treatise, as it is merely subjective. As he writes in The Essay as Form, “Instead
of achieving something scientifically, or creating something artistically, the effort of the
essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without scruple, on what others have
already done. The essay mirrors what is loved and hated instead of presenting the
intellect, on the model of a boundless work ethic, as creatio ex nihilo.”90 In his writings,
Adorno mobilizes the essay in a methodological manner, as he believes it is the only
mode of presentation that adheres to the present social reality. Therefore, the essay is
capable of holding out against the cheap reconciliation of ideology because it does not
disavow antagonism. In this view, the essay is the form responsible for conveying the
semiotic through conscious manipulation of the symbolic.
Adorno’s writings in Notes to Literature elucidate his theory that the dialectical
relationship between philosophy and literature parallels the conflictual nature of social
reality. His dialectical style of writing enables him to communicate his position that any
attempt to render this reality in a non-contradictory manner is purely ideological and
false. As he writes, “The ambitious transcendence of language beyond its meaning
results in a meaninglessness that can easily be seized upon by a positivism to which one
thinks oneself superior; and yet, one falls victim to positivism precisely through that
meaninglessness that positivism criticizes and shares with it.”91 For Adorno, art partakes
of these contradictions. Like Heidegger’s problem of the abyss, Adorno’s issues with
the culture of post-Holocaust horror are rooted in the notion that there are no new forms
to communicate the new, degraded culture. Therefore, 20th century concepts are forced
into 18th century forms—they are incapable of communicating anything that comes after
the horrors of the 20th century. It seems that, for Adorno, the best explanation for the
dialectical relationship between culture and literature lies at the formal level.
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3.2 | Lacoue-Labarthe & Political Implications
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe focuses his criticisms of Martin Heidegger’s writing
on content rather than form. He writes to reveal and condemn what he believes to be the
fascist nature of Heidegger’s thought. He believes that the political motivations behind
Heidegger’s writings overshadow his philosophy entirely. To back up this weighty
claim, Lacoue-Labarthe assembled five of his lectures presented between 1987 and 1998
that highlight the damning “aesthetic-politico” echoes in Heidegger’s work. In
Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry, Lacoue-Labarthe examines the intellectual
background of Heidegger’s treatment of poetry from Romanticism to German Idealism
and explores the implications of the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and
politics. He begins the prologue, entitled “Heidegger’s Onto-Mythology” by citing
Heidegger’s declaration that “Knowing a primal history is not ferreting out the primitive
and collecting bones. It is neither half nor whole natural science, but, if it is anything at
all, it is mythology.” 92 Lacoue-Labarthe lays the foundations here for his further
investigation of Heidegger’s concept of the provenance of the possibility of a ‘historical
Being’ by introducing the fundamental concept of the Mytheme, and ultimately the
possibility that Heidegger is the thinker of the National Socialist movement. He takes
issue with both the context of Heidegger’s analysis and than the implications of his
method.
In his reading of Hölderlin, Heidegger remains attached to the nationalistic ideals
of being ontologically rooted in German soil, though he rejects the bloody and
discriminatory biologism of the Nazis. Because of his commitment to Heimat, or
homeland, in his interpretations, it is necessary to consider Heidegger’s interpretation of
Hölderlin in the context of the political climate as it manifests itself and forms a motif in
his analysis. Without wholly reducing his poetic thought to party politics, LacoueLabarthe believes that the importance of Heidegger’s poetic thought lies in its
connection to the essential thought of National Socialism. He writes, “The proposition
“Heidegger is the thinker of National Socialism” means that Heidegger attempted to
92
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think—and he is probably the only one to do so—the unthought of National Socialism,
what he himself called in 1935 “the inner truth and greatness of the Movement.” 93
Whereas Adorno took issue with Heidegger’s hero-worshipping of poets, LacoueLabarthe problematizes his mythologizing of poetry itself towards the aim of
establishing this inner greatness. He goes on to suggest that Hölderlin must be
interpreted in a very different way and scrutinizes the relevant writings of Alain Badiou
to this end.
In the Prologue, Lacoue-Labarthe seeks to clarify the influences that shape
Heidegger’s concept of beginning. For Heidegger, “The fundamental error… is the
opinion that the inception of history is primitive and backward, clumsy and weak. The
opposite is true. The inception is what is most uncanny and the most violent.”94 LacoueLabarthe points out that even though Heidegger has distanced himself from the National
Socialist party, this statement is “somber” because of the obvious aesthetico-politico
echo of a statement combining the origin of “knowledge” of the glorious inception of
Greek history with “mythology” if the dream of German ideology was to invent a
national myth characterized by the mimetic relationship between the Modern and the
Ancient. Lacoue-Labarthe writes here that creation of a myth was deemed to be the only
way to constitute an origin for the German “historial Dasein”, as Heidegger would
phrase it. The dream of instituting a national myth is also illustrated by Wagner,
Nietzsche, and of course the Nationalist Socialist project. Lacoue-Labarthe briefly
defends Heidegger here, noting that is impossible to confuse Heidegger’s actual
positions with those of the Nazis.
He then moves on to develop the idea of the beginning, or Anfang, even further.
First he identifies the term ‘mythology’ as a hapax, or a term that only occurs once, in
Heidegger’s writings on the Ur-Geschichte, an idea about the transcendental beginning
of history he first presented in Being and Time.
Heidegger emphasized the need to find an origin of the spiritual-historical
Dasein, and suggested it could be found in the irruption of Greek philosophy. This
irruption, for Heidegger, represents the first time that a people rose up to “face beings as
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a whole… as the beings that they are”. Lacoue-Labarthe asks what the implications of
“placing oneself” under the Greek beginning are, and Heidegger answered that this
beginning is a-temporal in that it “stands there as the distant injunction that orders us to
recapture its greatness” despite it’s historical context.95 Lacoue-Labarthe compares this
to the notion of Dasein as put forth in Being and Time, in terms of its a-temporal
characteristics and inability to be exhausted. The parallel between the Anfang and the
Dasein is, “why the opening of History, the rebeginning, is a repetition or retrieval of
what did not yet arrive or begin.”96 Lacoue-Labarthe seems to argue that this represents
the movement of techne from ontology of work to that of art. From this point on in the
prologue, he is able to explicate the ways in which Heidegger equalizes art, origin,
history, and myth. If the Ur-Geschichte as the origin of History is a matter of
mythology, as Heidegger says, than art is essentially myth in its ability to characterize
the beginning.
In this way, the mission of beginning has fallen entirely to mythology. Myth is
the historical inscription of a people, and the poem is a Mytheme, or that element which
is essential to the myth. By this, it is originary and capable of characterizing a “national
epic”. In the Epilogue, Lacoue-Labarthe writes, “Myth—die Sage, in Heidegger’s
vocabulary—reemerged …because it was thought to be originarily linked to the beingof-a-people: to “peoplehood.” Myth is the originary poem of every people.” 97It seems
as though this is a Romantic notion.
Lacoue-Labarthe then brings up a new interpretation, the “national modernist”
interpretation, that implies as Holderlin did that the Modern “should be understood…as
the repetition of what did not happen in the Ancient—and art, or politics, or both
together, should be understood as the anamnesis of the forgotten or the remembrance of
what is originarily “potential” but absent.” This would mean that there is no possible
founding myth, and any “mythological reconstitution is illusory, erroneous, and
indigent.”98 Any “German ideology” is only a representation of myth that is never more
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than a “confused and wounded ‘protest’”, to use Lacoue-Labarthe’s somewhat harsh
wording.
In chapter one, Lacoue-Labarthe takes up the question of the Poem’s vocation,
and he poses it as such, “Should poetry cease to be of interest to philosophy?”99 It seems
that the best way to go about determining the answer is to acknowledge the reason for
asking the question in the first place. Lacoue-Labarthe recognizes that Alain Badiou is
responsible for placing this problem at the center of what is at stake in philosophy. In
Being and Event, Badiou holds that the Poem is specifically suited to philosophical
discourse in the “age of the poets” from Holderlin to Celan. For Badiou, philosophy
should turn away from the Poem and re-devote itself to the initial conditions of the
Matheme—politics, love, poetry, and mathematics. Lacoue-Labarthe takes issue with
this thesis on the level of correctness and of justice. He points out that the stakes are
immense, as exploration of this topic necessarily involves Heidegger’s legacy—one that
notes the potential of the mutual exclusion of poetry, philosophy, and politics.
Lacoue-Labarthe seems to hold that Heidegger’s interpretation of myth as a
means of thinking, which is how he reads Hölderlin, reflects the emphasis on aesthetics
and politics from the era of German Romanticism. He held the Romantic poets to
represent speculative Idealism and sought to demarcate Hölderlin from this historical
implication. The Romantic poets, who represented the potential of German Ideology,
sought to invent a new mythology with the aim of bringing Germany into its true
historical, political place—to constitute an origin for a people’s “historial Dasein”.100
Heidegger’s treatment of myth is a reflection of the Romantic goal to create the
aesthetico-political, a goal that ultimately found expression through National Socialism.
Heidegger’s position between the philosophical and the political seems to render him
uniquely capable of speaking to the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and
politics. In a situation with such severe implications, it is of course impossible not to
choose a side.
Lacoue-Labarthe allows that the central aim of Badiou’s project is an attempt to
make philosophy possible again by returning to Plato’s founding gesture. Poetry must be
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repudiated so that philosophy can exclusively provide the basis for truth in politics. This
call for repudiation seems to be referring to the suturing between poetry, philosophy and
politics that Badiou would suggest needs to be “unsutured”, as philosophy needs to be
sutured to the other 3 aspects of the Matheme: politics, love, and mathematics. After
1945, in an effort to free itself of the political, philosophy handed itself over to the
Poem—this is problematic for Badiou. Lacoue-Labarthe notes that the poetry of Paul
Celan marks the end of the age of the poets for Badiou by calling for poetry to be sent
back to its own solitude.101 At this time, he raises 3 questions to Badiou’s thesis about
the relationship between philosophy, poetry, and politics.
First, it seems that Badiou’s concept of philosophy is too narrow for LacoueLabarthe, as is his concept of poetry. His list ignores Goethe, Rilke, and others. Celan,
Hölderlin, Heidegger would have differing lists. For Lacoue-Labarthe, this points to the
high political and philosophical stakes. Next, he asks if Badiou’s philosophical
absolutizing of poetry is grounded outside of poetry. For Lacoue-Labarthe, absolutizing
of poetry is based on the provenance, or native element which the myth promotes. This
includes the political connotations of myth as the potential to furnish a national identity.
Finally, he inquires as to the nature of the essential link between philosophy, poetry, and
politics? He does not ask to cast doubt upon the concept of the suture, but rather to
suggest that the Mytheme is sutured rather than the Poem. This seems to be where
Lacoue-Labarthe believes the politics to be engaged. He identifies the two remarks of
Badiou that speak to the bonds/sutures and lists three propositions to support his own
case.
First, Badiou states that the existence of the poets would have been aporetic
without Heidegger’s thought. The poets lent legitimate historicity to the thought that
philosophy was handed over to poetry when the idea of political historicity was abused
by National Socialism.102 Next, he speaks to the nature of the suture between philosophy
and poetry, and doing so incriminates their bond. He also incriminates the “suturing to
the political of philosophy’s suturing to the Poem”. 103 Lacoue-Labarthe argues that
Badiou is wrongly critical of the poem. Rather, he could solve the misunderstanding by
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identifying the Mytheme as the problematic element. Perhaps the Mytheme is that which
is sutured.
Lacoue-Labarthe bases his criticism on Alain Badiou’s concept of the “suturing”
of philosophy to poetry in his Manifesto for Philosophy. He identifies that it is Badiou’s
aim “to make philosophy possible once again by taking a step beyond the declaration of
its end.”104 For Badiou, this necessitates another event like Plato’s ‘surgical removal’ of
poetry from philosophy—an “unsuturing” of philosophy from its relationship with
poetry.
For Lacoue-Labarthe, Badiou leaves out the fact that philosophy’s problematic
relationship with poetry, which is present even in the very beginning of philosophy, is a
result of the origin of poetry, or myth. 105 Badiou wrongly believes philosophy to have
been sutured to the poem in the age of the poets. Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that
philosophy is historically sutured to the Mytheme, and that such a suturing has brought
about consequences for poetry, philosophy, and politics. 106
Lacoue-Labarthe goes onto say that philosophy’s refusal of myth, first
represented by Plato, was repeated in the 18th century by Immanuel Kant in his Critique.
Through his critique of metaphysics, Kant brought about “the first anamnesis of
philosophy and, therefore, the first repercussion after the fact…of the Platonic decision”
to separate myth from of philosophy.107 It is this anamnesis, or recollection, that seems
to have prepared the reactionary ground for the Romanticist project.
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Labarthe sees it, this Romantic pursuit of a new mythological religion led inevitably to
the National Socialist politics of the 1930s, as well as to the poetic thinking of
Heidegger.
So the suture does not join poetry and philosophy so much as it joins philosophy
and myth, a connection that has dangerous implications when considered in terms of
Nazi ideology. Lacoue-Labarthe traces the historical development of National Socialism
out of German Romanticism. He summarizes the Romantic project by citing Schelling,
“Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge; we may
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thus expect them, on completion, to flow back like so many individual streams into the
universal ocean of poetry from which they took their source… a new mythology is itself
to arise…”109 The making of myth is the foundation of the State, and so the creator of
the Mytheme plays a political role without being directly involved in the political,
himself.
The suturing that Heidegger speaks to in his separation from Nazism is not only
a suturing of philosophy and poetry, but also a “suturing to the political of philosophy’s
suturing to the Poem”.110 Since the Poem is a Mytheme for Heidegger, the withdrawal is
not a separation from politics. It seems that the political and the poetical are linked
further by his withdrawal. As Lacoue-Labarthe writes in the epilogue, “Every
withdrawal traces and draws out that from which it withdraws.” 111 The emphasis
changes —not from politics to poetry but from politics as poetry to myth. The
connection between politics and poetry is strengthened through myth. While Badiou sees
that Heidegger is “handing philosophy over to poetry”, Lacoue-Labarthe sees it as
handing philosophy and poetry together over to Myth and that is what makes Heidegger,
though not simply a Nazi, the thinker of National Socialism.112
Ultimately, it seems this first chapter is meant to present the implications of the
Heideggerian notion of myth as beginning and the implications of Badiou’s idea of the
suture/un-suturing of philosophy, poetry, and politics. Lacoue-Labarthe does leave the
end of the first chapter with a question. He asks, if it is possible today to think a Poem
without any Mytheme, “one that has renounced neither thinking itself in its possibility…
nor foretelling for human beings what is necessary—that is, answering, for their sake,
and in their favor, for what is necessary.”113 He then recalls Benjamin, who represents a
treatment of poetry that opposes the Heideggerian one.
Benjamin sought to get at the “esoteric heart” of Romanticism where history and
religion coincide.114For him, this was the location of the drive to create a new religion
based on “art understood in its essence”, Dichtung. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Benjamin
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seems to represent that the poetry of Romanticism necessitated interpretation. This is
where Lacoue-Labarthe ties the chapter together. Benjamin allows the designation of
poetry to return to the Matheme, as Badiou suggested it should. However, Benjamin’s
Matheme is “not the ‘mathematical’. It is the Poem itself, that is, prose. So, Why should
philosophy, or what remains of it ‘unsuture’ itself from the poem, if at the same time…
this can engage another politics.”115 Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger’s poetical
thought is archi-fascist whereas Benjamin saves both philosophy and poetry from the
political nature of the Mytheme. For Heidegger, the poetry of Hölderlin asks for an
heroic return to myth, while Benjamin reads it as a call for a new sobriety of art.116 What
Hölderlin is able to present through these alternate readings is that both philosophy and
poetry are incompatible with the Mytheme and require the Matheme instead.
In the Epilogue, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Heidegger enables us to understand
the “political stakes of art in the modern age” and allows the possibility of understanding
that techne is what is at stake in the modern political, in the sense that “the one who
fashions in the highest sense, is the statesman”.117 He wraps up the Epilogue by stating
that the notion of the ‘agonistic’, which seems to have played a great role in the
establishment of Nazi politics as ‘total artwork’, is present in three Heideggerian motifs.
These motifs of Uprootedness, Repetition of Greek destiny, and the theologico-political,
which Lacoue-Labarthe explains as the lamentation over an “existential loss”, the appeal
to a recommencement, and the listening to the poem as “gospel”, create the foundations
for the idea of the ‘political religion’ at the foundation of totalitarianism.
So, the question remains if Lacoue-Labarthe has proven Heidegger’s thought to
be fascist. He is aware of the fact that his text is short, only ninety-two pages, and that
this is hardly enough opportunity to fully develop such an incendiary claim. Whether or
not he establishes Heidegger’s fascism, Lacoue-Labarthe succeeds in clarifying the
relationship between Heidegger’s thought and National Socialism through his
presentation of the political implications of poetry as mythology.
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4 | Remembrance

Having worked through both Heidegger’s writings and the writings of two of his
critics, I can say that I understand why his decision to do away with the modern notion
of the subject creates problems from the standpoint of metaphysical analysis. The
modern notion of the subject allows for a direct connection between seeing and
signifying—it creates a reassuring aura of straightforwardness. However, I find myself
still unsure as to whether this new poetic language truly rids itself of any trace of
subjectivity, as Heidegger claims it does. I wonder if it is possible for there to be a
structure of the self that is allowed within the poem. If there were room for the notion of
the self within poetry, would it really hinder the poem’s ability to carry out ontological
saying? In her essay, Poetic Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of Being, Jennifer GosettiFerencei pursues a similar line of questioning by performing a close reading of
Hölderlin and seeking to detect a vestige of self within his verses.
Gosetti-Ferencei points out that for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry cannot be
reduced to subjective expression, historicity, or language. That is to say, Hölderlin’s
verses are not a result of his biological or empirical experiences. 118 Hölderlin is
complicit, as “the poet of poets” in the moment of transcending the metaphysical
understanding of the subject. Like the artist, the poet is tied to his accomplishment
through his creative production and subsequent abandonment of it. According to
Heidegger, the poet’s work should stand alone to communicate the truth of Being and
the founding of history. As Gosetti-Ferencei writes,
“The poet is not merely a being among beings, but a structure and a shelter
of the interstice between Being and beings, and the one who can wrest
himself, or rather is wrested, from the domination of beings as mere
actuality or mere presence—in order to utter the historical, essential word
of remembrance and preparation.”119

118 Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, “Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language:
Toward a New Poetics of Dasein.” (New York: Fordham University Press, 204) 101.
119
Gosetti-Ferencei, Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language, 105.

48
At this point, it occurs to me that this may mean the poet is not necessarily
characterized by any action that could turn him into the subject. He is passive and seems
to be more of a medium or vessel than an agent. I think that Gosetti-Ferencei truly
captures this passivity when she writes, “Thus poetic language, when it is essential, is
not to be reduced to communication, nor to culture, both of which imply Enlightenmenthumanist rather than historical-ontological concerns.”120 History and ontology are not
the result of subjectivity; rather, they are the products of Being, itself.
For Heidegger, the author of the poem is not the subject and therefore does not
determine the quality of the poetic utterance. He writes, “Who the author is remains
unimportant here, as with every other masterful poem. The mastery consists precisely in
this, that the poem can deny the poet’s person and name.” 121 This seems to
simultaneously confirm Adorno’s critical attitude towards Heidegger’s deification of the
poet and the notion that poetic experiences are ontological rather than subjective. The
idea that the identity of the poet is not of importance seems to further emphasize the
power of the poem itself.
Gosetti-Ferencei cites the philosophy of Julia Kristeva as she presents a
compelling alternative to Heidegger’s complete erasure of subjectivity. Kristeva, as
Gosetti-Ferencei notes, “suggests that every utterance, and thus every account of
language, implies a subject, albeit one radically conditioned or ‘shattered.”122 In fact, it
is Heidegger’s moment of Gelassenheit, or releasement, that reveals the subject’s role in
language.123 In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva builds on the ideas of Jacques
Lacan as she takes a psychoanalytic approach to an evaluation of language and comes up
with an idea that appears to present an alternative idea to Heidegger’s treatment of
subjectivity. For Kristeva, the language of poetry takes part in a dynamic signifying
process in which bodily drives are discharged through our efforts at signification and use
of words. The expression of our individual drives is what shapes our subjectivity, and
there are two modes of operation by which they are expressed.
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First, semiotic language is an evocation of feeling or a discharge of inner
energies. These are the sounds man uses in infancy to convey his basic needs through
rhythms and noises to his mother before he has access to symbolic forms of language.
Man uses symbolic language once he reaches the developmental stage in which he can
grasp the difference between himself and the objects that surround him and
communicate that difference with words. It is a mode of conveying clear and orderly
meaning that would be devoid of meaning were it not for the latent rhythms of the
semiotic that remain hidden in language even after man has a mastery of the symbolic.
This dependent, dialectical relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic
characterizes all linguistic expression after the point of this thetic break. Once the body
leaves prelinguistic, psychic space, bodily sounds turn into a verbal means of
communication and subjectivity begins to develop. The uneasy interchange between the
two modes of communication is impossible to transcend, so the subject is always in
process.
Kristeva’s post-Freudian idea of subjectivity shares with Heidegger the notion
that utterance in the form of speech is not the pivotal moment of language. Rather,
primal significations that are revealed in poetic language illustrate the ways in which
language can disclose itself in a moment of Gelassenheit. This echoes Heidegger’s
assertion that “language speaks”. Both also share the idea that language extends beyond
its communicative function to convey something essential about the experience of
Being, though Kristeva maintains that the semiotic presents the possibility of disclosing
the subject. Both also reject the idea that language is merely a communicative
expression that is produced consciously by the “self”, or subject—Kristeva’s theory of
the unsayable is grounded in social interactions while Heidegger’s essential “saying” is
not grounded in the idea of a body. It seems that Kristeva’s subjects gain the ability to
communicate effectively from social interaction, which clearly requires a body, while
Heidegger’s Beings get their beingness from words, themselves.
The semiotic, essential nature of language is made more obvious by the language
of poetry. Poetic language is uniquely capable of signifying ontologically because it
articulates the moment of the thetic break, or the moment when the symbolic outweighs
the semiotic, in a way that can be heard without ever being communicated in the realm
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of the symbolic. By verbally expressing this threshold, poetry confronts presuppositions
about the linguistic relationship between truth and clarity. For Heidegger, this
expression takes place independently of subjectivity, whereas Kristeva would say that it
illustrates the very essence of subjectivity. Either way, poetry represents a bringing to
the fore of the infinite realm of the semiotic that other forms do not.
It seems to me that Kristeva and Adorno agree that the trace of subjectivity is
located within language’s capacity for expression and designation. Though Heidegger
noted that language plays a role in the founding of Being, language also plays a role in
the furthering of Being through human interaction. To this view, the social element is
what gives language its truth; truth is located in the totality of the communicative
structure. This structure is what allows the message to be communicated. Kristeva’s
moment of the thetic break represents the synthesis of Heidegger’s ontology and
Adorno’s notion of individual expression, and is therefore capable of constituting a
subject without making the “self” necessary for meaningful communication to occur. In
this way, her poetic theory seems to me to represent a compromise between Heidegger’s
dismissal of subjectivity and the identity-driven utterances that characterize non-poetic
communication. It also allows for the violence that Adorno believes to characterize
language—in the absence of the paternalistic law of the symbolic realm there is nothing
to prevent the kind of violence that troubled Lacoue-Labarthe in his analysis, as well. It
seems that Lacoue-Labarthe was right, in a way, to point out that the ambiguity inherent
in Heidegger’s linguistic program creates the potential for a certain violence. However,
as Gosetti-Ferencei points out, the fascism of which Lacoue-Labarthe accuses Heidegger
hardly seems driven by semiotic and primal urges; rather, it seems almost wholly
symbolic in its ideology and obsessive in its adherence to history. 124 The dialectical
relationship between the two seems to be furthered by the suggestion that the semiotic
represents that which is most flexible and innate while fascism is unmoving and
imposing. The question remains whether the consequences of a return to the semiotic
prove the importance of the symbolic or suggest that the truth of Being is ambiguous
and violent and the symbolic represents the failure to suppress it.
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However, it is important to note that not all poetry succeeds in venturing beyond
subjectivity in Heidegger’s view. Rainer Maria Rilke’s poetry, especially his Duino
Elegies, did not receive the appreciation that Heidegger afforded Hölderlin. He wrote in
a 1982 lecture on Parmenides that Rilke’s concept of the Open did not come close to the
aletheia that poetry is required to perform to speak being.
“What Rilke terms “the Open”, principally in the eighth of his
Duino Elegies, has nothing but the sound of the same words in common
with what the thinking of the essence of aletheia comprehends in the term
“the Open”. A brief explanation of what Rilke means by “the Open” can
assist us to form a more stable concept and to be ready for a more clarified
contemplation of what is thought in the essential realm of aletheia by
means of a resolute differentiation from the Rilkean word. […] It is
necessary only to point out unambiguously, that Rilke’s naming of “the
Open” is different in every respect from what is conceived concerning “the
Open” in its essential relation to aletheia and from what is to be conceived
in terms of a conceptual question.”
On the continuum between the semiotic and the symbolic, the poem falls closer
to the semiotic while the essay is the closest to wholly symbolic as it is possible to be
while still maintaining a dimension of the philosophical. For Kristeva, it is because of
poetry that the thetic moment has not taken all communication and rendered it totally
symbolic. By this, poetry is able to illuminate the ineffability of Being by creating
infinite linguistic possibilities through the shattering of syntax.125 It seems to me that
because man is capable of composing poetry in this way, he is capable of experiencing
the ontological truth of his existence. However, I think Kristeva believes the primary
function of poetry is to balance the technical aspects of the symbolic rather than to
reveal truth about being. Nevertheless, both Kristeva and Heidegger agree that poetry
communicates something primordial by serving as the medium through which language
gathers Being and mortals together.
Having read the criticisms of Lacoue-Labarthe, I tend to agree that Heidegger’s
phenomenological project becomes muddled when considered in terms of a
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mythological beginning or return. While I would not deny that a departure from the rules
of the symbolic does a violence to the unity of the symbolic and the semiotic, I would
question whether this violence is dialectically problematic for the self. It seems to me
that it may actually allow the self to exist more truthfully. If subjectivity is a product of
the self’s unquestioning linguistic activities, then subjectivity comes from evaluating
objects in only the instrumental sense. This implies a lack of phenomenological
sensitivity, an ignorance of aletheia. 126 Poetry places the semiotic at the fore of
communication to promote awareness of that which must be uncovered.
The problem with poetry, it seems, is that the scattered syntax leaves the truth
content of a poem open to too much interpretation. As Adorno writes, “Since the
interpretation of poetry deals with what was not said, one cannot criticize the
interpretation for not being stated in the poetry.”127 The fact that there is the possibility
of multiple interpretations seems to signify that there is a necessary trace of subjectivity
within poetry, and it is this trace which gives each poem renewed meaning for the
individual. To my understanding, this is the element that gives poetry its uniquely broad
influence. By this, I mean that great poetry awakens something, though never the same
thing, in every reader who carefully considers it. I think that the universal truth that
poetry uncovers is the very fact that there is something to be uncovered, an essence to be
poetized, within every being. This is the element of commonality that communication
presupposes, and it is what is most important within the poem; it is more important than
the words on the page or the poet who put them there.
I think Heidegger would disagree with my synopsis because, admittedly, I am
evoking something like the human imagination, which he believes to be an element of
subjectivity fueled by mere images.128 Heidegger agrees that the relevant aspect of the
poem is not the content, but rather the “poeticized” (das Gedichtete). The content, as
imagery, appeals to imagination while the poeticized is the true subject matter, or
something more pure and essential to the experience of reading the poem.
In considering this question of imagery, I return to Heidegger’s analysis of
Georg Trakl’s A Winter Evening that I introduced in the second chapter. The poem is
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filled with vivid imagery that creates a clear picture of the chill of winter and the
isolated wanderers before they find the plentitude of the hearth. The first two stanzas
seem wholly characterized by this sort of imagery, and I cannot resist the scene forming
in my mind as I picture the snow falling and the dark paths. If the poet is able to cause
this scene in my mind, was it not first formed in his mind? In my view, the answer to
this question means either that the poet is indeed a subject, as he also possesses an image
of the scene in his consciousness, or, as Gosetti-Ferencei notes, for Heidegger these
objects “are the poet himself, since the poet’s word is the “telling-naming”… This does
not anthropomorphize these elements, but conversely, desubjectifies the poet. The poet
is himself a “sign”…”129 This is how the poet is uniquely capable of conjuring things in
their essences without participating in a relationship of dominance with the things. The
poet is not a subject because the things he writes about are gathered as echoes rather
than as his own unique moods or experiences.130
As the only medium that is capable of uncovering Being in its elusive
shieldedness, poetry relies on a primordial unity that is unbounded by human
subjectivity. This seems to me to be the element of poetry that is most mythological—
the continuing faith in what has been lost. The theme of remembrance of what has been
lost pervades Hölderlin’s poem Andenken, to which Heidegger dedicated a lecture in his
text Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry. The poem crystalizes the pain of incurable
distance while emphasizing the poet’s role in establishing permanence despite this
distance.
REMEMBRANCE
The northeast blows,
Of winds the dearest
To me, because a fiery spirit
And a good voyage it promises to mariners.
But go now and greet,
The beautiful Garonne,
And the gardens of Bordeaux
There, where along the sharp bank
Runs the path and into the river
Deep falls the brook, but above
Gaze out a noble pair
129
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Of oaks and white poplars;
Still I remember this well, and how
The broad treetops of the elm wood
Lean over the mill,
But in the courtyard a fig-tree grows.
On holidays there too
Walk the brown women
On silken soil,
In the month of March,
When night and day are equal
And over slow paths,
Heavy with golden dreams,
Lulling breezes drift.
But someone pass me,
Full of dark light,
The fragrant cup,
So that I may rest; for sweet
Would be slumber in the shade.
It is not good
To be soulless with mortal
Thoughts. But a
Conversation is good and to say
The heart’s intention, to hear much
About days of love,
And deeds which occurred.
But where are the friends? Bellarmin
With his companion? Many
Are shy of going to the source;
For richness begins namely
In the sea. They,
Like painters, bring together
The beauty of the earth and disdain
Not the winged war, and
To dwell alone, for years, beneath
The leafless mast, where through the night gleam neither
The holidays of the town,
Nor lyre-music and native dancing.
But now to the Indies
The men have gone,
There to the windy peak
On vine-covered hills, where down
The Dordogne comes
And together with the magnificent
Garonne as wide as the sea
The river flows out. But it is
The sea that takes and gives memory,
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And love too fixes attentive eyes
But what remains is founded by the poets.131

Whereas Rilke failed to reach far enough into the abyss and was therefore not
fully capable of questioning metaphysics in his Duino Elegies, Hölderlin is able to
emerge from the Cartesian frame and conjure a place of origin for being; he can access
the Open. Heidegger’s idea of the potential of poetry seems completely embodied in
Hölderlin’s Andenken, or Rememberance. For Heidegger, the act of remembering
represents the opposite of the modern, metaphysical drive to absorb and dominate; that
is why Andenken is capable of capturing the moment of aletheia that great poets can
conjure through their venturing.
For Heidegger, remembrance, or commemoration, represents a return to the
determination without dominance that has been forgotten—it speaks more to destiny than
it does to history. This is the destiny of the truth of being. As Avital Ronell points out,
Heidegger’s 1941-42 lectures entitled Andenken in Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry
was presented at a historically relevant time, a time at which he is believed to have
instilled his talk with a disillusioned debate with the biologism of National Socialism.132
He insists, in his opening remarks, that the reader must not become awestruck by the
beauty of a poem, as that would mean he were approaching it as if it were an object. He
writes, “through a hasty attachment to “subject matter,” our attention to the poetic word
would be immediately led into error.”133
Heidegger interprets the poem’s landscape to reveal the tropes that convey
something more than a recollection of personal experience; the content is not that which
is essential. Each element of the landscape, from the fig tree to the women, comes to the
poet in the form of a thought that has created a marking within his memory. Heidegger
tracks the events of greeting, sending, strangeness, celebration, and commemoration as
they compose the poet’s encounter with his thoughts. He believes Hölderlin’s mariners to
be poets who “must therefore know the heavenly bodies and be masters in reading the
131 Martin Heidegger, “Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry.” Trans: Keith Hoeller. (New York:
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quarters of the sky.”134 The aforementioned wind beckons the poets as mariners toward
their destiny; they take part in the willing that illustrates man’s driving toward his destiny
in poetry. But just as soon as the wind greets the poet, he instructs it to go away. By this,
the wind illustrates the ultimate transience—a vehicle for the poet’s willing, though he
himself is grounded in historicity.135
Because the gusts of wind in Hölderlin’s opening line and the lulling breezes of
later stanzas represent the fleeting nature of our encounter with our originary past rather
than just wind, special attention should be paid to their movement in the poem. The poet
sends the wind to reconstitute his memory through greeting. This is illuminated in the
line, “Geh aber nun und grüße /But go now, go and greet.” This Greeting is at once a
return and indicative of a departure. As Avital Ronell writes, “The genuine Greeting
amounts to a kind of promising correspondence, a reciprocal promise that aims to
correspond to the most essential level of the other…The Greeting is a letting be of things
and of human beings.”136 This is a greeting without economy or permanence; rather, it
seems representative of an uncovering of being. Authentic truth is revealed through this
greeting, as it is echoed in the poem’s landscape, which is a gathering greater than a mere
collection of objects. Greeting allows the poet to establish a nearness in which he can
experience the light of the true greeting.137 For Heidegger, poetry allows a remembrance
of greeting and therefore a founding for the poet’s dwelling. Though we cannot find a
foundation in the abyss, the poets create a new foundation out of what remains through
poetry.
The origin of this founding is located in the last line, “But what remains is
founded by the poets.” This famous and much interpreted final line seems to establish
why Hölderlin is both the poet of poets and Heidegger’s muse. His poetry comes close to
the origin of Being and creates a grounding for man in the abyss by the passive gesturing
of the will. As Heidegger writes in Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry, “We never find
the ground in the abyss. Being is never a being. But because being and the essence of
things can never be calculated and derived from what is present at hand, they must be
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freely created, posited and bestowed. Such free bestowal is a founding.”138 The granting
in Hölderlin’s verses is present in the echoes of the poet’s thoughts. The verses are
constituted by thoughts, and the subject falls away to the passivity of commemoration.
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Conclusion |

Heidegger’s critics are rightfully skeptical of his dialogue with Hölderlin’s poetry,
as his rejection of subjectivity represents a jarring departure from our understanding in
the modern era. Ultimately, a successful attempt to understand Heidegger’s theory of
language seems to require acceptance of the increasingly blurred line between poetry and
thought. The poet possesses the qualities of a thinker and the thinker takes on an element
of the poetic, though it seems that the two never quite become one in the same. The
progressively more poetic style in Heidegger’s writings after the turn toward Hölderlin’s
poetry illustrates this merging. His inclusion of “The Thinker as Poet” in Poetry,
Language, Thought makes the merging explicit.
After turning from his explication of the intricacies of Dasein in Being and Time,
Heidegger’s adoption of a poetic style allows him to identify the thinking that surpasses
mere instrumental representation. Heidegger’s understanding of poetry as a projective
utterance capable of founding truth renders it uniquely capable of bringing forth Being
without subjectivity, as I hope to have shown. The poet alone is capable of perceiving the
concealed unknown and disclosing its truth to Being. Without poetry, we would be
unquestioning in our groundlessness—value-driven entities lacking authentic humanity.
Heidegger sought to find a means by which man could go outside of his understanding of
consciousness to come together with Being. He found a path in the language of great
poetry.

59

Bibliography |
Adorno, Theodor W. 1991. Notes to Literature vol I & II. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann New
York: Columbia University Press
Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. The Jargon of Authenticity. Evanston, Ill: Northwestern
University Press
Allen, William S. 2007. Ellipsis: of poetry and the experience of language after
Heidegger, Ho lderlin, and Blanchot. Albany: State University of New York.
Cerbone, David. 1999. “Heidegger and Dasein’s ‘Bodily Nature’”, in in Donn Welton
(ed.), The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series
Editor), Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Paul Edwards, “Heidegger’s Quest for Being”, Philosophy: Cambridge University Press
Vol, 64. No. 250. (Oct., 1989) p 456. Http://www.jstor.com/stable/ (Accessed 25/11/09)
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger and in Hölderlin’s
“Andenken””. In Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s . ed.
James, Risser. 1999. New York: State University of New York Press.
Gossetti-Ferencei, Jennifer. 2004. Heidegger, Holderlin, and the Subject of Poetic
Language: Towards a New Poetics of Dasein. New York: Fordham University Press
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. New York: Harper.
Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Contributions to Philosophy: from Enowning. Bloomington,
Ind: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 2000. Elucidations of Ho lderlin's poetry. Trans. Keith Hoeller.
Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books
Heidegger, Martin. 2009. Logic as the question concerning the essence of language.
Albany: State University of New York Press
Heidegger, Martin. 1971. Poetry, language, thought. New York: Harper & Row.
Kleinberg-Levin, David. 1999. "The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment: Heidegger's
Thinking of Being," in Donn Welton (ed.), The Body: Classic and Contemporary
Readings, in Simon Critchley (Series Editor), Blackwell Readings in Continental
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 122-149
Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1972. On Heidegger and Language. Evanston [Ill.]: Northwestern
University Press.

60

Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. 2007. Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
Ronell, Avital. “On the Misery of Theory without Poetry: Heidegger's Reading of
Hölderlin's "Andenken"”, PMLA , Vol. 120, No. 1, Special Topic: On Poetry (Jan., 2005),
pp. 16-32. Published by: Modern Language Association Article Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25486142
Scott, Charles E. 2001. Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to philosophy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Sherman, David. 2007. Sartre and Adorno: the dialectics of subjectivity. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press
Wrathall, Mark A. 2011. Heidegger and Unconcealment: truth, language, and history.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

